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Activities of the Italian MAS and pocket submarines in the Black Sea: 1942 - 1943 |
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by Alberto Rosselli |
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Part I |
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| At the end of March 1942, at the time of the German offensive in Crimea and the imminent attack against the well-defended naval base of Sebastopol, the German high command realized the need to have sufficient numbers of fast smaller units, and a substantial number of pocket submarines, to provide for the defense of naval traffic along the southern cost of the Crimean peninsula and within the Sea of Azov.
Since the Germans were unable to provide for the necessary means to complete this task (at the beginning of spring 1942, the Germans sent to the Black Sea utilizing the Danube a small number of shneellboats and coastal submarines), Admiral Reader requested assistance from the Italian naval command, in this far away sector, (but also on Lake Ladoga) with a mixed flotilla of MAS, pocket submarines, and explosive motorboats.
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| These were means tailored to oppose the frightening Soviet fleet of the Black Sea, which included a battleship (Pariskaja Kommuna), four heavy cruisers (including the Molotov, built before the war by Italian designers), ten destroyers (including some larger ones, like the Kharkov Class), the Tasken, 29 small and medium submarines, and numerous patrol and transport units.
Favorably impressed by the numerous successed obtained by these kind of vessels in the Mediterranean, Reader had good reasons to consider the Italian contribution more than positively (it should be considered that the first official request for Italian participation in the Black Sea was made by the German admiral on January 14th, 1942 in expectation of the great German offensive in southern Ukraine). For the record, it should be noted that during the period of German-Italian collaboration (1940-1943), this was the only time in which Germany made a specific request for intervention because of “the superiority of the light surface and underwater torpedo crafts of the Regia Marina in comparison to what we had” (Reader). In order to compensate for the prolific activity of the German U-Boats in the Mediterranean (sent starting in 1941) against the British forces, The Italians did not want to let their ally down, and Admiral Riccardi gave immediate orders to send 4 MAS (with a displacement of 24 t.), 6 submarines class CD (35 t.), 5 torpedo-motor boats, and 5 explosive motorboats.
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| The three units were grouped into the 101st squadron and incorporated for the transfer into the Moccagatta convoy.
The assault fleet was placed under the command of C.F. Francesco Mimbelli. It was immediately realized that the greatest problem was the transfer of the equipment to the Black Sea. In fact, the only possible solution was to transport the vessels over land since, as it is known, the Dardanelles were interdicted by international convention to all military traffic. In attempting to solve this difficult problem, the Navy gave proof of great abilities and creativity by creating a special convoy of 28 vehicles, 3 tractors, and 9 trucks. |
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| After having successfully mastered numerous obstacles and difficulties (the drivers and the soldiers had to, in some cases, demolish and rebuild constructions along the way thus allowing for the transit of the large vehicles), the convoy reached Vienna where the vessels were slipped into the Danube, eventually reaching the Rumanian port of Costanza on May 2nd. From this point, with a fast and uneventful transfer, the Italian units finally reached the Russian port of Yalta which became their first operational base.
A few days after their arrival in this port located on the southern shores of the Crimean peninsula, the Italian units were ready to intervene against the numerous Soviet military and transport ships present in the sector between the fortress of Sebastopol, the Strait of Kerch, and the bases of Novorossijsk and Tuapse. |
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| From May 1942 to May 1943, the Italian units performed intense and brilliant activities, scoring several sinkings and earning the respect of the German ally and the Russian enemies alike. On the 11th and 13th of June, 1942 the MAS torpedoed a 5,000 t. steamship (and sank it) and a troop transport of about 10,000 t., later finished off by Junker 87s (Stukas) of the German Air Force. Divided for security and tactical reasons between the bases of Yalta and Feodosia, the Italian units had to deal with the ferocious Russian aerial offensive which had more that 700 fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance planes in that area. Since the Italian forces
could not count on an adequate defense (the Germans were fiercely engaged against the fortified bastion of Sebastapol and Balaklava first, and the Mariupol, Rostov, Krasnodar frontline later), the MAS and the pocket submarines experienced many losses.
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| At sunset on the 13th of June, a group of Soviet fighter-bombers Yak e Ilijushin, assisted by six motor torpedo boats, caused the loss of the submarine commanded by S.T.V. Farolfi. The loss was almost immediately compensated by two brilliant victories by the Italian forces: on the 15th and the 18th , during a night action, CB 3 and 2 (pocket submarines) torpedoed and sank, while they were traveling on the surface, the Soviet submarines S32 (1,070 t.) and SHCH 306 (705 t.). | ||
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| Translated from Italian by Cristiano D'Adamo and Edited by Laura K. Yost |
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