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Operation BAby Andrea Piccinotti |
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| This article is part of a series which includes: Operation Bona Operation Toro |
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Upon Italy's entry in the war, the Regia Marina had to immediately
concentrate resources on the protection of traffic destined for
Libya. This was accomplished better than it is commonly believed,
and in almost all of 1940 the Italian Navy did not organize any
offensive action. In the summer of 1941, the first study for an
offensive action, called "Operation BA", was started.
This plan contemplated an incursion by light forces to surprise
British naval units engaged in the surveillance of costal traffic
between the Balearic Islands and Cartagena (Spain). Following the
German offensive against Russia, destroyers based in Malta
intensified patrols in the Spanish waters searching for contraband
cargo aboard Spanish, French, Swiss and Turkish ships. It should
be noted that the British considered contraband any goods destined
for Italy or Germany, including medicines. The study of the
operational habits of the enemy, and the British tendency to
operate with only two groups of destroyers without the support of
cruisers, pushed the operatives within Supermarina to immediately
conceive the first plan (on July 15th, Admiral Campioni was
replaced by the younger and much respected Admiral Sansonetti).
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To overcome the limited range of their destroyers, the Italian
Planning Office (operations planning office within Supermarina)
decided to concentrate the attack force in La Maddalena
(Sardinia). The Italian group would have included two light
cruisers of the "Di Giussano" class and four destroyers.
The group would have left port at 11:00 AM a day before action day
(day X) and, taking advantage of the very limited British aerial
reconnaissance in the area, would have reached the zone between
Cartagena and the Balearic Islands early morning of the following
day. The ships would have traveled 44 hours, covering around 800
miles at about 18 knots, thus leaving the commander at sea with
the option of forcing to full speed for about one hour while
engaging the enemy. The oil fuel consumed would have totaled 1,650
tons, to which one would have to add the fuel necessary to reach
La Maddalena and then return to the original bases. |
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| It was also necessary to obtain further intelligence
regarding the patrol schedule followed by the British, thus
reducing the quantity of fuel oil necessary to locate the enemy.
A failed mission, even though politically useful, was not at the
time acceptable. Furthermore, aerial exploration was to be
intensified starting from the day before action day and up to a
day after. Meantime, the British, starting in June 1941, began
to periodically send naval groups composed of two aircraft
carriers escorted by a battleship tasked with the delivery of
airplanes to Malta. In a later study, it was taken into
consideration that it would have been more appropriate to
utilize two of the newer cruisers because they were more
protected than the faster, but vulnerable, "Di Giussano"
class. Up to this point, since 1939, the Regia Marina had
realized that the "Di Giussano" class could not match
enemy cruisers and therefore should be used in other functions. Any further study of this operation ceased for various reasons: first, it was not possible to ascertain when the British destroyers would be engaged in a patrol, and second, there was an increasing demand for light cruisers to escort convoys to Libya. |
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