Operation Judgment
(Taranto's Night)

November 11th-12th, 1940
by Cristiano D'Adamo

Introduction

Following the Battle of Punta Stilo (Encounter off Calabria), the Regia Marina had decisively implemented the policy of "Fleet in Being". The theory behind this doctrine assumed that the threat of a powerful navy would be enough to deter the enemy from conducting an active campaign. Perhaps this approach reflected the general expectations of the Italian armed forces, which saw this war as a short prelude to a very bountiful armistice. To be fair, the various armed forces, perhaps partially excluding the Regia Aeronautica, were very well aware of the limitations of the Italian war machine. It is surprising to see that the Regia Marina, which knew that a prolonged confrontation would bring about her demise, did not actively pursued a decisive confrontation against the British Navy. Perhaps, the memories of Lissa had not yet faded.

Different sources attribute Italian inactivity to the fact that the two Littorio Class battleships, which had just completed training, were not fully prepared for action. Undoubtedly, during early July these ships had experienced serious technical problems, including the failure of one of the main turrets due to water infiltration, but by early November these ships should have been considered fully readied.

Perhaps referential fear toward the Royal Navy kept Supermarina from acting with more resolution, or perhaps it was a more complex collection of reasons. Nevertheless, Italian inactivity prompted British action and so evolved the operation, which led to the deadly aerial attack against the naval base of Taranto.

Italian Mountain troops disembarking in Albania

Taranto's Night

During the Ethiopian crisis, when Great Britain and Italy appeared to be on the verge of an armed conflict, the Royal Navy conducted studies regarding the possibility of attacking the Italian naval base of Taranto. The plan, due to the resolution of the international political situation, was filed away, but not for long. Towards the end of the year 1940, Rear-Admiral Lyster began, once again, to plan an aerial attack on the large naval base.

Admiral Sir Lumbey St G. Lyster, KCB, CVO, DSO (right)

1. It is now known that the damages to the Eagle dated back to the battle of Punta Stilo when several near misses caused serious structural damage to the ship, including the fuel system.

British Aerial Reconnaissance

Italian Defenses

Leading to the attack

Before reaching her assigned position, the Illustrious had to endure problems with her aircraft, which, if not brought under control, could have easily jeopardized the whole action. At 12:19 of the 9^th, a Swordfish launched by the Illustrious experienced engine trouble and was forced to crash land near the Warspite. On the 10^th, at around 7:00 another Swordfish experienced similar problems and was lost. The same day, Italian planes continued attacking the British force, now fast approaching Malta, but around mid-day a Cant 501 was lost. A later attack conducted by ten bombers did not cause any damage.

A Farey Swordfish similar to the ones utilized on Taranto

The attack

The night of November 11th, a few miles off the Greek island of Cephalonia, about 170 miles from Taranto, the Illustrious released her Swordfish aircraft which, undetected, reached Taranto in two waves of 12 and 9 airplanes each. One of the planes in the first wave, due to a navigational error, reached Taranto 15 minutes before the rest of the squadron, causing the antiaircraft defenses to go into full alert.

H.M.S. Illustrious

First Wave

Between the attacks

The anti-aircraft guns were silenced between 23:20 and 23:35, but soon planes from the second wave began making their appearance over the sky of Taranto. More planes dropped bombs near the destroyers between 23:30 and 23:40. All weapons fell about 20 to 30 meters short of their target. These were probably the bombs launched by Mardeal-Ferreira and Murray-Paine. Of the two planes, the first repeated the attack twice, due to an early problem with the release mechanism.

Second Wave

Damages and Casualties
Photographic Documentation

Conclusions

As Admiral Cunnigham writes, the attack on Taranto reduced the threat of the Italian fleet, but it did not eliminate it . Despite the heavy losses, the Italian Navy was still of considerable force as it was demonstrated a few days later, during the Battle of Spartivento (Capo Teulada).

Throughout the years, authors have seen this historical event under substantially different prospectives and have reached opposite conclusions.

In 1951, Admiral Cunningham writes, " The crippling of half the Italian battle-fleet at a blow at Taranto had a profound effect on the naval strategical situation in the Mediterranean. The enemy promptly moved the rest of their fleet to Naples, whence they could still operate in the central Mediterranean by coming south through the Strait of Messina; but only under the closer observation of the Royal Air Force reconnaissance from Malta."

In 1951, the French Admiral Raimond de Belot writes: The victory of Taranto enabled Admiral Cunningham to send two battleships, Ramillies and Malaya, to the Atlantic; as he wrote to the Admiralty, the result permitted a judicious economy of force."

In 1957, Commander Bragadin writes, " The Taranto attack had temporarily but serious consequences in the strategic field because the Italian Navy was left with only two battleships in service, the Vittorio Veneto and the Cesare. The Doria, the last of the old four battleships undergoing modernization, was not yet ready for service."

In 1960, Captain S.W. Roskill writes, " …and the Fleet Air Arm crews unquestionably restored the balance of power in battleships, just when it was swinging strongly in the Italian favour"

In 1966, the controversial Italian author Antonio Trizzino begins a chapter dedicated to Taranto in his book "Navi e poltrone" with: "La disfatta subita senza combattere dalla marina italiana, nella notte dell'11 e 12 novembre 1940, decise le sorti della guerra tra l'Italia e la Grand Bretagna. Taranto fu la Trafalgar italiana".

In 1976, the Italian historian Arrigo Petacco writes, "Il 12 novembre anche le navi italiane uscite indenni dall'attacco degli aerosiluranti lasciavano Taranto per rifugiarsi nei porti di Napoli e La Spezia. Era una ritirata. Dopo cinque mesi di illusoria superioritą, la marina italina era gia alle corde."

"On November 12^th, the Italian ships which had survived the torpedo-bombers attack left Taranto to take cover in the ports of Naples and La Spezia. It was a retreat. After five months of illusionary superiority, the Italian Navy was already in a squeeze."

Also in 1976, the Spanish author Luis de la Sierra gives the only insight into how the Italians could have prevented or somewhat minimized the results of the attack, "Se quando fu dato l'allarme per l'approssimarsi della primaondata di apparecchi inglesi a taranto, mezz'ora prima del loro arrivo in Mar Grande, si fossero aperti I fumogeni dei caccia e degli incrociatori ormeggiati nella rada esterna, I piloti della Fleet Air Arm non avrebbero potuto vedere le corazzate di Campioni nonostante l'intensa luce dei bengala…"

"If following the first detection, when the aerial alarm was sounded, about 30 minutes before the arrival of the first wave, the smoke apparatuses on destroyers and cruisers had been fired up, the Fleet Air Arm pilots could not have seen Campioni's battleships, not even despite the intense lighting provided by the flares…".

In 1987, the Italian journalist Gianni Rocca writes, "La folle decisione di Mussolini di aggredire la Grecia, senza prevedere la pur inevitabile reazione inglese, cominciava a dare I suoi frutti. L'impreparazione di Supermarina a una guerra moderna ne aveva dato altri."

"Mussolini's insane decision to assault Greece, without planning for the avoidable British reaction, began to generate negative results. Supermarina's lack of readiness for a modern war generated even more negative results."

" The defeat suffered by the Italian Navy without fighting the night of November 11-12, 1940, defined the future of the war between Italy and Great Britain. Taranto was the Italian Trafalgar."

In 1994, Professor Sadkovich writes: "Both Sommerville and Cunningham remained wary of getting too close to the three remaining Italian battleships, and Sommerville's decision on November 17^th to launch a group of Hurricanes for Malta at the extreme limit of their range led to the loss of eleven of twelve aircraft."

In 1998 Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani write: "In all, the attack was brilliantly conceived and brilliantly executed."