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Battle
of Cape Teulada
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The mission ends |
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The New Zealand Star reached Alexandria on the 30th under escort from Force A, while convoy M.W.4 from Malta had arrived a day earlier. Francesco Mattesini, in the official book published by the U.S.M.M. (notes…) titled “La Battaglia di Capo Teulada” (The battle of Cape Teulada) lets Admiral Cunningham conclude the narration of the events by quoting from “A Saylor’s Odyssey”: “A feature of this cruise to the Central Mediterranean, and a most unusual one, was that not a single gun was fired by the Warspite or any of the ships in company with her throughout the whole of seven days at sea”. |
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Comments |
| Andrew Browne Cunningham A Sailor's Odyssey 1951 As the Italian battle fleet was now crippled it was decided to send an important convoy from the United Kingdom right through the Mediterranean with supplies for Malta and Alexandria. As usual, it would be brought to the entrance to the Sicilian Narrows covered by force "H" from Gibraltar, and met by the Mediterranean Fleet off Malta and taken on to its destination. Of course the Fleet Air Arm got no hits, although they claimed to have done so, and it is obvious that all enemy ships had the legs of Force "H".
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Marc'Antonio Bragadin The Italian Navy in World War II 1957 Again, the encounter had brought out clearly what the lack of effective and immediate air intervention meant in a naval battle. Although the Italian Fleet was very near the Sardinian airfileds, the British torpedo planes had been able to attack without any Italian fighter opposition. |
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Angelo Iachino Tramonto di una grande marina 1959 This time around, the British risked once again to be caught at a disadvantage by our naval forces. Due to our poor long-range reconnaissance and the failure of the interdiction forces in the Sicilian Narrows, once again we could score a success, which would have balanced the misfortune of November 11th (Taranto). |
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S.W. Roskill White Ensign - The British Navy at War, 1939-1945 1960 Though the operation had been completely successful, Somerville was criticized in London for not continuing the pursuit of the Italian fleet, and the Admiralty had actually set up a Board of Inquiry at Gibraltar before he returned to that base. |
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Donald Macyntyre The Battle for the Mediterranean 1964 Nevertheless, it was undoubtedly air power which had decided the course of events, the presence of the Ark Royal weighing most heavily on Campioni's mind as he made his decision to retire. The capital ships on the other side again failed to come within range of each other's guns. Meanwhile, the convoy for Malta had been left undisturbed to reach harbor safely with their precious cargo. |
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Luis de la Sierra La guerra naval en el Mediterràneo (1940-1943) 1976 As it usually happens under such circumstances, after the battle of Cape Teulada both navies over evaluated their success. The official British war bulletin announced the torpedoing of a “Littorio” class battleship and the damaging of three cruisers and two destroyers. The Italian media denied, and since the British insisted, Supermarina decided to put an end to the controversy inviting seventeen foreign journalists to the naval bases of Naples and Messina. This was a very unusual maneuver, but a successful one because the BBC eventually gave up. |
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Arrigo Petacco Le battaglie navali del mediterraneo nella seconda guerra mondiale 1976 The Battle of Cape Teulada ended with two shots aboard the Lanciere and two more aboard the Berwick. Once back to their bases, both the British and Italian admirals faced very bitter times. |
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Gianni Rocca Fucilate gli ammiragli 1987 Even Campioni felt better; he had faced the British fleet a few days after Taranto and now he was seeing it sailing away. The Italian forces were undamaged, and this was what mattered the most. |
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Bernard Ireland The War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943 1993 Campioni knew nothing of the convoy, nor of the presence of Ark Royal and force "D". Assuming himself faced only with force "H", at less than full strength, he felt justified in seeking a fight, in accordance with the cautious post-Taranto guidelines that had been given to him. |
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James J. Sadkovich The Italian Navy in World War II 1994 In Britain Sommerville was almost censured for cowardice, and in Italy a reshuffling of the naval command assuaged Italian disappointment over Campioni's decision not to engage. Cunningham's claim that Sommerville had force the Italian into "full flight" was disingenuous, and Di Sambuy was more accurate to see the action as a tactical victory for the RMI, which had held its own against the British fleet. |
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Nathan Miller War at Sea 1995 Upon sighting the battleships, the Italians realized they had lost the opportunity to exploit their earlier superiority, and broke off the action. |
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Robert Jackson The Royal Navy in World War II 1997 The enemy force was now in full retreat under cover of a dense smokescreen, and Admiral Somerville, realizing that the engagement had brought him within easy striking distance of enemy bomber bases, decided to break off the chase and return to the vital task of guarding the convoy. |
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Jack Green and Alessandro Massignani The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943 1998 This battle showed that the Italian strategy now required that the Regia Aeronautica keep fighters over the fleet to protect it both from British torpedo planes and reconnaissance aircraft, and this need to provide air cover would give rise to both the proposed conversion of the Acquila to a carrier equipped only with fighters, and mounting catapult-launched fighters on warships. |
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