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Action
off Calabria
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The Italian ConvoyThe Esperia, Calitea, Pisani, Foscarini left Naples at 18:00 on July 6 under escort
from the 14th "Squadriglia" (leader R.N. Procione), while the Barbaro
left Catania (Sicily) at 11 on July 7th. In route the speed on the convoy was
14 knots (fast convoy) then, not too far from Benghazi, the convoy split and the Esperia
and Calitea proceeded at 18 knots and the rest of the convoy at 14 knots. The general plan
was to deceive the British into believing that the final destination would be Tripoli,
when instead the destination would be the smaller port of Benghazi. |
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| The convoy, considering its importance, was provided with
several levels of protection. A direct escort included the A remote escort While the main battle group would include The commander at sea for the Italian force was Admiral Inigo Campioni. |
Leading to battleAt 07:58 on July 7th, when all the Italian Naval Groups (Divisioni) were still in port, Supermarina gave news of the imminent operation. At 00:40 on July 8th, Supermarina informed the fleet that radio location conducted at 20:00 of the previous day, had localized the British Fleet at about 60 miles north of Ras el Tin with a second group at about 45 miles more to the east and bound for Malta. Meantime, aerial reconnaissance located five transports in harbor at Malta. At 12:15 on the same day, it was confirmed that a large naval group (Group B) had left Alexandria at 16:00 of the previous day. The first information was accurate, while the subsequent ones were erroneous. The British Force (M.F.) left port late on the 7th and it cleared the harbor (Cunningham) by midnight; 00:00 on the 8th. The 00:40 message reached Admiral Campioni not sooner than 01:50. Until then, the
Italian Fleet had followed the prearranged plan, but after the message, Campioni thought
best to alter the plan. The Benghazi convoy on a 147 degree course was redirected to a 180
degrees one for the possible change of destination to Tripoli. The "Pola" group
was to be prepared to reunite with the "Cesare" group at 05:30. At down, two
planes from the 4 Div. Cruisers would explorer the area between 90 and 140 from the
battleship Cesare up to 100 mile radius. |
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| In the meantime, the submarine Beilul had informed
Supermarina that at 23:40 on the 7th it had attacked a British destroyer (1) and that the countermeasure had been particularly harsh. The submarine
was informing base of its return to Leros. At 07:10, after the negative reconnaissance
conducted by the two planes, (simply due to the fact that the British fleet was not
there), Campioni ordered the convoy back on course for Benghazi, along with the 7th Div
and the smaller escort. At 15:20 Campioni decided to move toward a previously detected British force of three battleships and 8 destroyers, which had been signaled by a plane from the Abruzzi and planes from the Regia Aeronautica. His intent was to interdict any British attempt to bomb the port of Benghazi. In the meantime at 18:20, Supermarina, having been able to decipher British signals, ordered Campioni not to engage the enemy. At 19:20, Campioni turned to 330 degree (almost due north) and moved the whole group back towards Italy. During this maneuver, at 19:20, some of the ships were attacked by British bombers which did not score any hits. Reportedly, during the night, the Italians avoided two distinct torpedo attacks
conducted by their own destroyers. At 04:30 the group Pigafetta, having misidentified
shades in the dark, went on the attack without hitting the incoming heavy cruisers
"Trentos" which were later recognized by the group Folgore. At 10:30-12:30 the
destroyers Dardo, Da Noli, Strale return to Taranto due to technical failure, and at 14:00
they were followed by the light cruisers Diaz and Cadorna also victims of engine failure. |
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| In the meantime, Supermarina had already forwarded the necessary
instructions to Campioni, ordering the fleet to converge at 14:00 to a point around
37"40 17"20, about 65 miles south east of Punta Stilo, in
preparation for the expected engagement with the British. This is an important point
because many British books assert that Cunningham was seeking battle while the Italians
were running away. Multiple sources confirm that the Italian Fleet was waiting for the
British and that it had position itself in a strategically appropriate position. Campioni
sent some of the destroyers back to the Sicilian bases to refuel and recalled the
"Vivaldi" group, which had been left in Taranto. These destroyers left port at
06:18 on the 9th. The departure of the Vivaldi group will have an important bearing on the soon to develop polemic over the failed intervention of the two "Vittorio Veneto" class battleships at anchor in Taranto. In fact, with the departure of the Vivaldi group, the two capital ships were left without a proper screen and their adventuring into the submarine-infested Gulf of Taranto would have been a serious gamble. |
Part II |
(1) H.M.S. Hasty |
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