OPERATION "GAUDO"
AND
THE BATTLE OF MATAPAN
PART VII

 March 27 ~ 29, 1941
by Marc De Angelis

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Conclusions

The Gaudo and Matapan operation, based on a notion of surprise that vanished right from the start and whose objectives soon turned out to be non existent, was flawed both in its planning and in its execution.  Unfortunately, that planning and that execution were all that could be logically expected from a military organization of limited means and of backward ideas in comparison with its opponent, which greatly surpassed it from the technical point of view.

In summarizing the factors that enabled the British to win at Matapan, it is clear that they were essentially the same elements that granted the Royal Navy superiority over the Regia Marina on many other occasions as well.  These factors were, not necessarily in order of importance:

Ultra, i.e. the ability to decrypt messages transmitted through the Enigma apparatus;

The Fleet Air Arm, along with better communications with the Royal Air Force;

Radar;

The ability to fight effectively at night.

An Italian newspaper of the time reporting the first news of the battle.
(Photo Salvatore Romano)

Except for the first one, which in fact was more or less offset by the cryptographic methods used by the Axis, all others stemmed from a conceptual disparity between the two Navies.  The Royal Navy was generally willing to look ahead and take new ideas on board if they were considered valid; on the contrary, the Regia Marina was skeptical towards any innovation and ended up stubbornly clinging to methods that the crucible of battle proved to be obsolete[1].

A possible objection to my analysis is that, had it not been for Iachino’s judgment errors and Cattaneo’s flawed tactics, the British, in spite of their technical superiority, would have achieved a far more modest result: this is undoubtedly true.  But I would like to counter this objection with two observations of my own.  First of all, if it had not been for Cunningham’s and Pridham-Wippell’s mistakes, perhaps the British might have even succeeded in closing the Italian main body and achieve complete success: so human errors affected both sides.  Secondly, if there was a common thread linking together Iachino’s, Cattaneo’s, and Supermarina’s decisions, it was in fact the failure to take into due consideration the contingency that the enemy could be capable of effective night fighting.  Conditioned as they were by the fact that their own capital ships were not suitable for night fighting, they projected this limitation onto the enemy as well: a consequence, albeit indirect, of that very conceptual inferiority we have already mentioned.

In the final analysis, the Italians found themselves, throughout the entirety of the war, facing an opponent whose technical superiority had its roots in his more advanced fighting concepts.  The Regia Marina should still be credited for putting up a good fight on many occasions, mostly thanks to the individual feats of a few brave men.  Matapan, by contrast, highlighted almost exclusively its limitations.

Author’s Note

Before I started writing this article, I tried to obtain as much information as I could, consulting documents published by both sides and in different eras, and trying to bring to light both the protagonists’ and the historians’ views.  As I have tried to explain, I also avoided delving too deeply into specific details and I would not be surprised if, as a result of this choice, I ended up omitting facts or issues which others would deem worthy of discussion.  If readers would like to make observations in this respect, or bring to my attention aspects of this article they consider incomplete or inexact, I urge them to let me know via email, if possible stating the source document they used as the basis for their comments.  As regards the analysis and the personal views expressed in the article, I am sure that there will be no lack of dissenting opinions.  Again, I urge all those who do not share my views and who have convincing arguments to let me know, so that, if necessary, amendments and corrections may be included to improve the essay.

Marc de Angelis (Arivederci@aol.com)

CDR, USN (RET.)

Arlington, April 2001

Translation by Sebastian De Angelis