OPERATION "GAUDO"
AND
THE BATTLE OF MATAPAN
PART IV

 March 27 ~ 29, 1941
by Marc De Angelis

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The Chase

During the morning, Cunningham’s steaming had been slowed by Warspite’s clogged condensers and by Formidable’s course changes as the carrier had to head into the wind frequently to launch and recover her aircraft.  Around 1400, however, after the wind had shifted or died down and the flagship’s condenser problems had been solved, the British were able to tighten up their formation.  Pridham-Wippell’s cruisers, which in the meantime had gotten within visual range of Cunningham’s escorting destroyers, were in the van, followed by the battle force’s destroyers and lastly by the battleships in company with Formidable.  While the force was still scattered, however, an event took place which could have radically changed the outcome of the operation.  A section of Italian torpedo bombers, led by the famous Captain Buscaglia, resolutely but unsuccessfully attacked the carrier while she and the Barham were separated from the other units.  The attack, which took place around 1215, was not only reported with a delay of about two hours, but was described as a mere sighting.  The message rectifying this error, sent later by Buscaglia’s Command, reached Supermarina, which decided it would not be necessary to retransmit it to Iachino.  Hence, the Italian admiral incorrectly went on believing that the sighting had been made by a reconnaissance plane.  The report stated that a battleship and an aircraft carrier, with several cruisers and destroyers, were roughly seventy miles Southeast of the Italian ships, on a course of 210 and at a speed of sixteen knots.  Neither the composition of the force nor its course and speed data were correct, but the position was fairly close to the actual one.  Unfortunately, however, Iachino lent more credit to set of radio bearings that placed the British flagship 170 miles away from him.
 

R.N. Vittorio Veneto
(Photo AMPA)

Several other sightings were made by Italian and German aircraft later on 28 March as well.  Two in particular, received after the Italians were forced to reduce speed as a result of the torpedo hit on the Vittorio Veneto, should have alerted Iachino that Cunningham was not only closer than had initially been figured, but was also gaining on him. According to the official version[2], one of these reports was received with gross inaccuracies, while the other one never did reach the flagship.  Aside from the serious doubts surrounding this version, it must have been far from easy to compile and interpret the data, which never arrived in real time because, due to another organizational failing, the aircraft transmitted on a different frequency from the ones the ships were tuned in to[3]. Besides, whether the British were fifty or one hundred and fifty miles away, after the torpedo hit on the flagship the Italians headed for home at a speed approaching the top one allowed by the Vittorio Veneto’s engineering plant[4], and at that point they could do no more.  Iachino’s judgment error, therefore, did not turn into a critical factor until later, when the Pola went dead in the water following the final British torpedo attack.
 

R.N. Pola
(Photo AMPA)

Further muddying the already murky waters, just after 1700 Iachino was informed that a German reconnaissance airplane had sighted a group of light cruiser in the Kythera Channel, steaming westward.  The admiral concluded, based on those ships’ course, that their task was to cut off his retreat.  In fact, these were the three destroyers Cunningham had positioned Northwest of Crete with scouting duties, but Iachino had no way of knowing this.  To parry the potential attack, the Italian admiral detached the Abruzzi group, with which he was to meet the following morning, ordering Admiral Legnani to return to Brindisi independently.  He then gathered all remaining ships around the Vittorio Veneto, forming them in five columns, and told Cattaneo, whose ships would have been the most exposed to the alleged light cruisers’ action, to be ready to engage the enemy.
 

The R.N. Vittorio Veneto returning to base. Note the R.O. 43 displaced
 and the destroyer Alpino on the right and Bersagliere on the left.
(Photo Fraccaroli)

In closing the parenthesis on the topic of the sighting reports and their effects, let us now return to the chronological accounts of the events.  On their way home, the Italian ships were - as stated - attacked several times by bombers and torpedo planes, and in the course of one such attack a torpedo struck the Vittorio Veneto astern, at around 1530.  Cunningham’s wish had thus come true, but, even at his slower speed, Iachino could not be engaged during the daylight hours.  In addition, by thrusting too far westward the British ships would become vulnerable to the attacks of those same German dive bombers which, a few months previously, had nearly sunk the Illustrious, veteran of the Taranto raid and Formidable’s sister ship.  The Mediterranean Fleet C-in-C therefore ordered yet another air attack at dusk, accepting the possibility of a night time action against the recommendations made by some of the officers in his staff, whom he accused, in very colorful terms, of cowardice[5]. 

When his cryptographers intercepted and decrypted Cunningham’s message ordering the participating air squadrons to mount a torpedo attack immediately after sunset, Iachino was promptly informed, and he in turn alerted his task force.  He also asked for long range fighter cover, but neither the Italians nor the Germans acted on this request.  It should be noted that Superimarina, which had also intercepted Cunningham’s message with the details of the dusk attack, did not re-transmit it to Iachino until after the attack had already been carried out. 

Part V

Translation by Sebastian De Angelis