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OPERATION "GAUDO"
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Foreword
The Conference of Merano |
Brief SummaryFollowing a report from the Luftwaffe advising the Italian Navy that at
least two British battleships had been sunk in the port of Alexandria (Egypt) the Italian
navy left port in pursuit of an Allied convoy. Unknown to the Italian admiralty, the three
British battleships based in Alexandria, the Barham, Valiant and Warspite, were, along
with the aircraft carrier Formidable, escorting the very same convoy. |
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| The battleship Vittorio Veneto sailed from Naples on March 26th. The 3rd
squadron (Trieste, Trento Bolzano) left Messina, the 8th (Garibaldi, Abruzzi) Brindisi and
the 1st (Zara, Pola, Fiume) Taranto. At 12:25 PM on the 28th, the cruiser Trieste informed
the Italian Commander Admiral Iachino of the presence of a British Flying Boat
(Sunderland); the Italian element of surprise was thus lost. |
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| Admiral Cunningham, having already received information
regarding the Italian presence from ULTRA, left Alexandria on the night of the 27th. On
the morning of March 29th, 1941 minor vessels from the two navies made contact without
either command realizing the presence of capital ships. The Squadron led by the Trieste
initiated an attach on British cruisers but it was itself the target of an airborne attach
by planes from the aircraft carrier Formidable. With no hits scored, both groups
retreated. |
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| With the Italian fleet sailing back towards the Italian peninsula, the British forces
launched a second air attach this time scoring a hit on one of the propellers of the
Vittorio Veneto. With its speed reduced to 16 knots, later to be increased to 19, the
Italian fleet lost considerable ground to the oncoming British forces. At around 8 PM the Pola is hit by a torpedo which leave her dead in the water. At this point the Italians make the fatal error of sending the Zara and Fiume to her rescue. Past 10 PM, off cape Matapan (Tainaron), the southernmost point of continental Greece, crew of the battleship Valiant detected on their radar screens an enemy ship at about 16,000 yards. The Italian fleet, is to be noted, was not equipped with radar. Thinking that the vessel detected was the Vittorio Veneto, the British commander, admiral Cunnigham, directed its fleet toward the sighted vessel. The vessel sighted was not the battleship Vittorio Veneto, but the heavy cruiser Pola damaged by an aereal torpedo attach.
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| Soon after, the heavy cruisers Zara and Fiume and the
destroyer Alfieri were also sighted. The Italian group was at less than 4,000 yards from
the 15" guns of the British battleships and within minutes the Fiume was completely
destroyed. Soon after, the Zara and the Alfieri were both afire and completely crippled. |
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| Fearing the arrival of other Italian forces, the British
battleships left the site of the battle leaving the sinking of the Zara, Pola Alfieri and
Carducci to a group of destroyers under the command of Captain Philip Mack. Italian
casualties were staggering, with many of the sailors dying of cold and fatigue before the
arrival of the hospital ship Gradisca. |
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| According to Sir Harry Hinsley, a well known author who
specializes in the history of the British deciphering efforts, the allied success in the
Battle of Matapan is to be partially credited to the British abily of breaking into German
and Italian codes. The interception and decryption of messages from the Luftwaffe, which
used the Enigma machine, and the earlier breaking of Italian codes allowed the British
forces enough warning to overcome distances in the Mediterranean. |
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| Completely opposite is the view of Professor Santoni who, in his book "Il vero Traditore" (This book contradicts Hinsley's speculations and provided historical data to support it). |
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